What we don’t know is how effective the 1,500 Afghan police to be posted to Marjah will be

February 27, 2010

By Peter Worthington

An oddity of the “surge” attack on the Taliban stronghold of Marjah (now in its 13th day) is the number of journalists given a ringside seat — American journalists, that is, whose reportage is unusually enthusiastic and optimistic.

A reason for this public attention is probably because as Marjah goes, so will go the “war” in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, touching the Pakistan border.

So far, the massive attack by 6,000 U.S. troops, Marines, Brits and the Afghan National Army (ANC), seems to have forced the Taliban to amend previous vows to stand and fight. Already they’ve melted into the scenery, gearing to fight another day on their terms.

The test in Marjah is not beating or ousting the Taliban — that’s basically a given. It’s whether the ANC, Afghan police and government people can effectively control the area once coalition troops start pulling back.

Can Afghanis and the ANC cope with Taliban insurgency, if coalition troops aren’t around to guarantee security?

Polls show something like 38% of Afghanis want foreigners out — but 68% want the Americans and NATO to stick around until the Taliban are eliminated, or are persuaded to cooperate with the Karzai government, such as it is.

Apart from thousands of mines and IEDs, a huge inconvenience for coalition forces — especially newly arrived American troops, be they straight from the U.S., or transferred up from Iraq — are the rules of engagement that require soldiers to take all sorts of precautions and checks before they open fire.

The fear of shooting civilians is acute, and in some cases puts soldiers at greater risk. The consequences of this are the Taliban use civilians as human shields — nothing new for Islamic militancy, as it’s a tested tactic that works. Just ask the Israelis, who well-know Hamas rocket launchers are imbedded in dense civilian locations, to deter Israeli rocket or shelling reprisals.

Canadian soldiers know that when they’ve been ambushed, and break up the ambush, insurgents claim to be innocent farmers, having dropped or hidden their weapons. This claim may persuade human rights activists and some politicians, but gunpowder residue tests prove those captured have been using more than hoes and rakes.

IEDs and roadside bombs are the weapon of choice of the Taliban. At Marjah, armoured “breachers” are at work — a sort of combination tank and bulldozer that supposedly clears paths for advancing soldiers. Effective, but slow.

Also being tested are explosive devises that create shock waves ahead of advancing troops that supposedly set off mines and IEDs. In the Second World War, tanks fitted with flailing chains in front, exploded mines for advancing infantry. In Rhodesia’s guerrilla war, vehicles with huge tires filled with water reduced the lethal effect of mines.

IEDs in Afghanistan are so powerful they leave deep craters and bowl over tanks.

This is only the start of a year of coalition attacks in Afghanistan.

We know the Yanks, Brits, Dutch and Canadians will do what’s expected of them.

What we don’t know is how effective the 1,500 Afghan police to be posted to Marjah will be, or how effective the ANA will be at deterring the Taliban when they are left on their own.

One thing seems certain: Without the restraining influence of NATO troops when the ANC takes over, it’s likely Geneva Convention rules for treating prisoners will become a distant memory.