The case for the killer captain
April 3, 2010
By PETER WORTHINGTON
Even though the court martial of Capt. Robert Semrau in Gatineau, Que., is expected to last into June, so far there’s little indication of sympathy or understanding of the pressures faced by a junior officer in a field command. Semrau is the first Canadian to be charged with murdering an enemy combatant on a battlefield.
Semrau is also charged with attempted murder (in case murder fails), disgraceful conduct and negligence of duty.
If one didn’t know better, one might suppose he’s facing a lynch trial — politically motivated to advertise Canadian sanctimony.
By every account — even the prosecution’s — Semrau was an outstanding officer whom the Crown seeks to send to prison.
Semrau’s lawyer from the judge advocate general’s (JAG) legal department (Major Steve Turner) wanted the five-officer panel to be in civilian clothes so their rank would be unknown.
This was rightly rejected. They all know who is who.
What he should have urged is that panel (jury) members be drawn from combat arms who have served under fire and know what Semrau faced, when his patrol in Helmand province was ambushed by Taliban insurgents, and a mortally wounded Talib was subsequently shot.
According to The Canadian Press, the panel is comprised of a commodore, a colonel, two majors and a captain — one navy, two airforce and two army (branch of service unknown).
It seems a safe bet that none has ever been ambushed nor shot at, or faced the instant decisions a patrol commander in enemy territory must make.
Semrau’s choice was to abort the patrol and tend to the grievously wounded enemy — thus ensuring the ambush to stop the patrol succeeded — or to leave the man to the mercies of the Afghan National Army he was mentoring, and who’d already kicked and spat on the insurgent, and would have undoubtedly brutally killed him.
Instead, the wounded man was given a quick, merciful death. And the patrol carried on.
It’s hard to convey responsibilities a young officer faces in the field. Situations arise that require instant decisions that aren’t covered in training manuals.
While Afghanistan is unique, I recall leading patrols in Korea where poor judgment can be fatal.
I once led a patrol to investigate an earthen dyke behind which it was believed the Chinese were holed up waiting to attack at night.
We encountered a minefield through which there was no path. Rather than turn back, I ordered the lead soldier to go through it, gambling he’d not step on a mine. If he had — I’d have been toast at a court martial.
My decision was wrong. I should have taken the lead, not ordered someone else to do it. I was going by the book.
On return, I did take the lead, with the rest of the patrol using my footsteps in the snow and advancing single file and well spaced. I later had nightmares about first risking someone else’s life instead of my own.
That Oct. 19, 2008, Semrau did what he thought was right. He should not be charged.
The incident should have been ignored. And every (combat) soldier knows it.
Sen. John Kerry, the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 2004, won a Silver Star in Vietnam when he killed a wounded Vietnamese fighter who had shot at him.
In the Korean War, Lieut. Russ Gardiner and Cpl. Karl Fowler captured a Chinese soldier whom they beat horribly to shut him up as they brought him back to allied lines. They weren’t charged with abuse, but rightly decorated with a Military Cross and Military Medal.
Both were from Semrau’s regiment, the RCR, both legends in the ranks of Korean veterans.